Petition

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

No. 81 5820

JOHN D. FISHER

Petitioner

vs.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

No.

JOHN D. FISHER

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vs.

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Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

JOHN D. FISHER petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case.

(i)

Questions Presented

1. Whether a mere customer of a racketeering enterprise is criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. Section 1962.

2. Whether joint trial principles of Kotteakos vs. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) are inapplicable to RICO prosecutions.

3. Whether the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. Section 1962, authorizes a finding of membership in or association with an illicit enterprise, where the Defendant's

only connection with the enterprise or its activities consists of isolated or sporadic acts, without continuity of association or participation.

4. Whether a person engages in a pattern of racketeering activity by participation in a single isolated act or transaction, if it is possible to institute two or more criminal charges against him resulting from that act or transaction.

5. Adoption of Co-Defendant's issues.

List of Parties

Rosario Palermo

William H. Brown

John D. Fisher

Robert D. Young

Joseph Macaluso

Frank Scionti

Sam C. Martino

Paul Guarino

Jimmy Farina

Rolando Gonzalez Rodriguez

Joseph C. Russello

Amalia Morgado

Joseph D. Lazzara

United States of America

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18 U.S.C. 1961

18 U.S.C. 1962

18 U.S.C. 3231

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JOHN D. FISHER petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals United States vs. Martino, et al is reported at 648 F.2d 367.

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the lower Court was filed on June 19, 1981. (App. A, infra). The judgment of the Court of Appeals has not been rendered because Petitioner procured a stay of mandate until December 10, 1981 (App. B infra.). A petition for rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc (by adoption) were timely filed on August 1, 1981. (App. C, infra). These petitions were denied on September 17, 1981 (App. D, infra). The jurisdiction of this Court is involved under 28 U.S.C. Section 1254(1).

STATUTES INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. Section 1341.

"Section 1341. Frauds and swindles

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false of fraudulent pretense, representations...for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do...any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon...shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

18 U.S.C Section 1961.

"Section 1961. Definitions.

As used in this chapter -

(1) 'Racketeering activity' means (A) any act or threat involving...arson..., which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under...title 18, United States Code:...section 1341 (relating to mail fraud)...,

(4) 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) 'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;..."

18 U.S.C. Section 1962.

"1962. Prohibited activities.

...(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise...to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 8, 1977, a 35 Count Indictment was filed in District Court, Tampa, Florida charging Petitioner and others with conspiracy, racketeering and mail fraud. Petitioner was charged in Count 1 with conspiracy to conduct and to participate in the conduct of the affairs of en enterprise through a pattern in the racketeering activity (Section 1962(d) of Title 18). Petitioner was charged in Count 2 with racketeering in that he did conduct or participate in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (Section 1962(c) of Title 18). Petitioner was charged in Counts 34 and 35 (subsequently Counts 32 and 33) with the crime of mail fraud involving a letter which was mailed by an insurance agent to National Union Fire Insurance Company, New York, New York regarding an insurance policy and a letter which was mailed by Lawrence H. Luppens, Jr., attorney to Monarch Adjusting, Inc., Ft. Lauderdale, Florida containing a letter enclosing sworn statements in Proof of Loss.

After trial by jury, Petitioner was found guilty of Count 1 (Conspiracy), Count 2 (Racketeering) and Counts 32 and 33 (Mail Fraud, Armenia Avenue fire).

Petitioner was adjudged guilty on the charge returned under each guilty verdict. On April 14, 1978, Petitioner was sentenced to a 8 year term of imprisonment

on Count 1, an 8 year term of imprisonment on Count 2, and a 5 year term of imprisonment on Counts 32 and 33. These terms of imprisonment were all to run concurrently with each other. Jurisdiction in the trial court was premised upon 18 U.S.C. Section 3231.

From 1972 until mid-1976, the City of Tampa, Florida was plagued with a rash of residential and commercial arsons. Common features suggested that the fires were the work of a single person or of a single group of persons operating together.

Although the origin of the fires was similar in each case, the nature and condition of the burned buildings were not. The structures ranged from abandoned and dilapidated rental houses to a nearly new office and apartment building that was fully occupied and making a healthy profit.

In the investigation by the Tampa Fire Department the name of Willie Noriega began to appear with frequency. He had a history of involvement with fires since 1963 when, at 19, he set fire to his mother's house in Tampa and was arrested by the Tampa Fire Marshal while sitting outside watching the flames. On that occasion he was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic by a psychiatric panel and was committed to a mental hospital for several months.

On several occasions in 1974 and 1975 Noriega was seen by policemen and firefighters at fire scenes. On one occasion a policeman observed him to be in an apparent state of sexual excitement while watching a fire at a large commercial building. The first solid evidence of his involvement in the fires was discovered in November 1975, when a residential fire was extinguished

before serious damage had been done. As a result, Noriega was indicted for arson by the Hillsborough County State's Attorney.

As early as February, 1976, while the state arson charge was pending, Noriega initiated conversations with FBI agents and federal prosecutors that eventually resulted in the indictment in this case. In a series of interviews beginning in June 1976, Noriega told the federal officials that he had personally set scores of residential and commercial fires in Tampa since 1972, alone or in conjunction with others.

On February 26, 1976, subsequent to Noriega's initial contact with law enforcement agents, John D. Fisher purchased a two-story brick apartment and office building, located at 1907-15 North Armenia Avenue, in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida for the sum of $17,500 and thereafter spent approximately $25,000 for various improvements to renovate the building. On or before that date, insurance for the building and its contents was obtained. The total amount of coverage of the fire insurance, which was issued by five (5) separate insurance companies policies was $125,000 on the building and $20,000 on the contents contained therein. The value of the building for insurance purposes was determined from 1) a Commercial Fire prepared by Retail Credit report Company on March 19, 1976, which estimated the net worth of the building to be in the neighborhood of $150,000 and 2) an appraisal prepared for I. Arthur Yanoff and Company which estimated the replacement cost of the building to be approximately $176,000. Petitioner's building was subsequently destroyed by fire during the evening of April 13, 1976, as a result of certain acts of arson allegedly committed by Willie Noriega.

At the time of the fire, John D. Fisher had established a branch office of his bail bond business on the first floor of the building.

John D. Fisher reported the arson of his building to his insurance agent, Robert D. Young, who in turn referred the claim to I. Arthur Yanoff and Company.

An insurance adjuster, Thomas P. Willis of Consolidated Claims Service, Inc. of Tampa, Florida, personally examined the fire loss at 1907-15 North Armenia Avenue and viewed the remains of the building and its contents the morning after the fire. Mr. Willis met with John D. Fisher with regard to possible settlement of the insurance claim of John D. Fisher. Subsequently Mr. Willis informed Mr. Young that he preferred to postpone these negotiations inasmuch as Federal Bureau of Investigation and Grand Jury investigations of the Armenia fire were pending.

At no time was any $125,000 claim or portion thereof collected on the Armenia building as found by the jury, as erroneously stated by the Government, and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Appendix A, page 78). This is illustrative of the prejudicial confusion and errors arising from the Government's conduct of this complex case.

Notwithstanding, this single, unrelated episode and Noriega's abandonment of the "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity" while cooperating with law enforcement authorization, the Court held that each count of mail fraud properly could be considered as a separate and distinct act of racketeering, and thus that a defendant could be found to be a member of Noriega's enterprise, and to have conducted its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, even though he was not alleged to have had any other

connection with Noriega, or any of his associates, or any other instance of criminal conduct, so long as the mails were used at least twice in processing his insurance claim. 648 F.2d at 402-404.

ARGUMENT

This Court should accept jurisdiction to determine issues of exceptional public importance concerning the meaning and application of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The wide variety of fact patterns in this case renders it uniquely appropriate for review in that the decision of the Court below conflicts with those of this Court.

In United States v. Turkette, ____ U.S. ____, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981), this Court distinguished the "enterprise" from the "pattern of racketeering activity" by which the enterprise is operated. Both terms were defined in an extremely broad manner. As to the scope of the statute the only remaining dispute relates to the activity which an individual must engage in to be criminally liable.

In applying the statute, a person must be "employed by or associated with" the enterprise in order to be criminally liable. Since the term "associated with" is extremely broad, minor or even innocent contact with the enterprise would seem to satisfy the association requirement. Thus, this phrase gives no real guidance in determining what an individual (not the enterprise) must do to violate the statute.

To violate the statute, an individual must "conduct or participate directly or indirectly in the conduct

of such enterprise's affairs". This language is extremely important to the determination of individual liability. It is the construction of this portion of the statute which has generated the confusing and glaring conflict between Circuit Court decisions.

Per United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347; 1374-1376 (4th Cir. 1979) an individual must be involved in the operation or management of the enterprise's affairs. Thus, Mandel, supra., reaches those associates of the enterprise who function together as a continuing unit with a common purpose. This is consistant with the concept of the enterprise defined in Turkette, supra., at 2528.

In Martino, supra., the Fifth Circuit rejected the contention that mere customers of the enterprise's arson service do not conduct or participate directly or indirectly in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. Martino, supra., at 382 and 402. The Martino court went further and determined that by committing two predicate crimes related to the affairs of the enterprise, a person participates in the enterprise and thus violates RICO. Martino, supra at 403.

Under Turkette, supra., the enterprise is comprised only of those associates who function as a continuing unit with a common purpose. However, under Martino, supra., a person can violate the statute and yet not be one of the associates who function together as a continuing unit with the requisite common purpose.

This case illustrates the important difference between the Mandel and Martino constructions. Under both Martino, supra., and Mandel, supra., those persons who assist in the management of the enterprise or

who personally assist in carrying out the acts of racketeering activity can legitimately be considered a part of the enterprise's structure. Such persons operate the enterprise, have a common purpose and should be knowledgeable enough about the activities of the enterprise to appreciate the additional risks involved. However, under Mandel, supra., mere customers would not be subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. Section 1962; but would, of course, be subject to prosecution for underlying acts.

Under Martino, supra., persons who are mere customers associated only with isolated or sporadic acts without continuity of association or participation are subject to prosecution under both 18 U.S.C. Section 1962 and under the statutes proscribing the underlying acts of racketeering activity. Thus, customers who do not function as part of a continuing unit with another and who share no common purpose with each other are tried "in mass" with each other and with those who manage, control or operate the enterprise. The guilt or innocence of such customers simply cannot be reliably determined alternatively with respect to the RICO application or the underlying isolated acts.

The term "conduct" referred to in both 18 U.S.C. Section 1511 and 18 U.S.C. Section 1955. In reviewing these sections, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that "conduct" refers to those who participate in the operation of the entity, but does not include customers. United States v. Marrifield, 515 F. 2d 877; 880-881 (5th Cir. 1975). If basic principles of due process are to be adhered "conduct" must be permitted to describe drastically differing applications when used in similar context within a single piece of legislation.

The focus of RICO is on continuing conduct. The prosecution is required to show a defendant's membership

in the alleged enterprise and his conduct of its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. "Pattern of racketeering activity" is not defined in terms of offenses; it is defined in terms of conduct, of acts, and then only in terms of the bare minimum that, under any circumstances, may be found to be a pattern. A pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity...," 18 U.S.C. Section 1961(5), but two separate predicate acts are not necessarily enough to constitute a pattern. Multiple mail fraud counts arising from a single episode do not constitute the two acts to form the requisite pattern.

In Turkette this Court did not consider the question of the application of RICO to a single episode. Novia Turkette the heart, soul and brains of the enterprise, was the sole defendant. Turkette headed an enterprise that specialized in robbing pharmacies and also engaged in arson for profit. He planned and participated in every robbery, organized the sale of the stolen drugs, and arranged every arson in which the group engaged. Turkette was the principal defendant instead of the government's star witness, and he entreated this Court to determine the boundary between RICO liability as a continuing pattern of racketerring activity and single, isolated conduct not constituting enterprise membership.

The extension of RICO to encompass the application of multiple acts in a single episode is not within a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) the indictment charged a single conspiracy, but the government proved multiple conspiracies in a multi-defendant, complex case. This Court reversed, finding prejudicial error under the facts of the case. In Martino, supra,

the appellants contended that the indictment charged a single conspiracy, but that the government proved multiple conspiracies in a multi-defendant complex case. The Martino court at p. 8244 dismissed this contention by finding no variance affecting the appellants' substantial rights.

In Martino, supra., the court was faced with a case which was factually indistinguishable from Kotteakos, supra. There Simon Brown, who secured FHA home improvement loans for customers of his construction business, decided that brokering such loans could become profitable. He created and operated an "enterprise" specializing in obtaining fraudulent FHA loans, fraudulent in that they were not used for purposes required by law and as stated in the applications themselves. Brown was assisted in operating this enterprise by employees and others who located applicants, assisted in preparing false documents, and performed various other tasks. For his services, Brown charged 5% of each loan, handling over 100 before he was caught.

Conspiracy to violate the National Housing Act was charged against 32 persons, mostly borrowers. Brown pleaded guilty and testified against 19 former customers in a joint trial. Kotteakos and Regenbogen had been introduced by Lekacos to Brown, who obtained four loans for them. They had had no connection with any other defendant or transaction, or with Brown or his organization, apart from those loans. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the government's attempt to justify charging them as having been "all parties to the enterprise". 151 F.2d at 170. However, the Court thought the error harmless, since the jury must have found that each defendant conspired separately with Brown in order to find them members of the conspiracy

charged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the error could not be considered harmless where so many unrelated undertakings, in which the only common purpose was that of Brown to broker as many fraudulent loans as he could, were brought together for common trial.

In Martino, supra., Noriega, like Brown, operated an enterprise. Like Brown, he was regularly assisted by a few confederates. Like Brown, he dealt mainly with individuals who, except for a single transaction, or episode had no connection with him, his enterprise, his confederates, or any similar transaction. Like Brown, he testified against them all in a mass trial.

The Martino court set down a rigid rule against which to measure the prejudicial variance claim. "If the government proves multiple conspiracies and a defendant's involvement in at least one of them," then there is no variance affecting the Defendant's substantial rights. Such a rule is a repudiation of the rule announced in Kotteakos, supra., and of that announced in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).

In Berger, supra., the Defendants were charged with one conspiracy, but the government's evidence established two. The Berger court accepted jurisdiction in the case to determine whether such a variance was per se fatal.

It is clear that from Berger, that proof of multiple conspiracies under a single conspiracy count is neither a per se harmful variance nor per se harmless variance. A reviewing court must look to the underlying facts. The Martino court refused to look at the underlying facts, but chose instead to generate a per se harmless variance rule.

No tangible evidence ever was offered at trial incriminating John D. Fisher in any activities of the arson enterprise charged in the Indictment.

In its attempt to prove its charges against Fisher, the Government presented several witnesses who gave testimony regarding him. However, none of their testimony was incriminating. John Fisher solely was convicted upon the testimony of Willie Noriega.

Mr. Fisher did purchase the Armenia building. He did open his bail bond office therein. And additional funds were spent by Mr. Fisher to renovate the building for other rentals. Mr. Fisher also secured insurance coverage on the building from his general insurance agent co-petitioner Robert D. Young, who in the past had arranged other insurace coverage for him such as motor vehicle liability. This is the extent of his so-called involvement in the enterprise.

Under the Kotteakos decision, it is clear that in the multi-defendant complex criminal case, a variance between allegation and proof is not to be dismissed under a per se non-judicial rule. The Martino court's attempt to do so should be specifically addressed and put to rest by this Court.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing arguments and authorities, Petitioner respectfully requests an order granting the Petition for Writ of Certiorari so that this Court may answer the important questions set out above and eliminate the conflict in decisions.

Respectfully submitted,



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Appendix

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 78-5260

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appelle,

versus

John D. Fisher,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Arthur W. Fisher, III
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Attorney for Appellant-
John D. Fisher

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 78-5260

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

JOHN D. FISHER,

Defendant-Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Appellate Rules, John D. Fisher seeks rehearing in this cause. For grounds, Appellant would show that this court has overlooked or failed to consider the following:

I

In United States v. Turkette, ___ U.S. _____, 29 CrL 3086 (6/17/81), the United States Supreme Court determined that the RICO statute reached both licit and illicit enterprises. However, the Turkette court also opined:

> "In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an 'enterprise' and the connected 'pattern of racketeering activity.' The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose

> of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on theother hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. 18 U.S.C. Section 1961(1). The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants of the enterprise. While the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other. The 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity'; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages." (Emphasis supplied). Turkette, supra., at 3088.

The charge enterprise in Turkette, like the charged enterprise in this case was an association in fact for the purpose of committing illegal acts under specified general categories of racketeering activity. Turkette, supra., at 3087. Under Turkette, such an enterprise must be composed of "a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." However, under the issue litigated in Turkette, supra., it was not necessary for the court to determine the specific common purpose shared by the associates comprising that enterprise. Under the issued presented in this case, it is necessary to isolate the specific common purpose shared by the associates of the enterprise in order to isolate the enterprise.

It should be self-evident that the more people charged as associates comprising the enterprise, the more difficult it will become to isolate the specific common purpose shared by all. It should also be self--evident that the inclusion of peripheral persons as associates comprising the enterprise renders the isolation of a specifi common purpose more difficult. In this case, the difficulty in isolating the enterprise is compounded both by the sheer number of associates alleged to comprise the enterprise and by the number of peripheral persons included in that large number.

It may be persuasively argued in this case that the central figures had a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct involving any and all acts of racketeering activity charged in the indictment and that, hence, the central figures comprised the enterprise. This was the factual setting found in United States v. Elliott, 571 F2d 880, 898 (5th Cir. 1978). However, it may not be persuasively argued that peripheral defendants in this case, specifically, the dissatisfied owners like John Fisher, shared any specific common purpose to engage in any and all acts of racketeering activity. The evidence in this case establishes, at best, that the dissatisfied owners like Appellant, had a much narrower purpose of profiting from arson

on property which they owned. Under Turkette, supra., dissatisfied owners are not sufficiently associated with nor are they associates of the enterprise.

Under Turkette, supra., proof of the enterprise is accomplished "by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit". The dissatisfied owners didn't function as part of a continuing unit any more than customers of a grocery store function as part of that commercial enterprise. Under Turkette, supra., the association of a customer with the enterprise is not the kind of association which generates liability under the RICO statute.

It must be remembered that the alleged customers are subject to arson prosecution in state court and mail fraud prosecution in Federal Court. Appellant submits that under Turkette, supra., he cannot be convicted under counts 1 and 2 because, as a customer, he was neither an associate of the enterprise nor sufficiently associated with the enterprise.

Moreover, there is absolutely no support or evidence as to the existence of an enterprise, relating to the 1907-1915 North Armenia Avenue property. If any enterprise does exist as suggested by the Government, such an enterprise would long be abandoned by Noriega. This is clearly supported by Noriega's own testimony at trial. Thus the Armenia property involved a single

isolated episode of a non-continuing nature. Thus the RICO statute was clearly misapplied, which is for this reasons that the District Court erred in denying the Motion for Severance. In this regard, appellant specifically adopts the argument of Appellant, Sam C. Martino to this end.

The real dangers of such a joint trial are dramatically illustrated by the continued confusion which prevade the trial and record itself. For example, at page 8278 of this Court's opinion, the Court observes that:

> ...After superficial repairs were made, insurance coverage was obtained. The building was heavily damaged by fire and $125,000 was collected from the insurance company.

The record and evidence is clear that no insurance proceeds were collected or realized on the Armenia property. The significant error is illustrative of significant confusion and error.

II

This Court still must rule on the Motion to Strike Part of Appelle's Brief filed with it on March 12, 1980 by Appellant Young, and adopted by Appellant Fisher relating to the Armenia property. Basis for this Motion was hearsay testimony barred by the trial court (82: 76-78; 83, 84) when the Honorable William Terrell Hodges granted Defendant counsel's Motion in Limine or, Alternatively, Motion to Strike (3: 70).

Accordingly, appellee's reference to this prior act (50: 313, 314) is impermissible, prejudicial commentary that prohibits equitable consideration of appellant's cause.

The government's March 17, 1980 Response to Appellant Young's Motion to Strike Part of Appellee's Brief in turn was answered by Appellant Young's Reply to Appellee's Response of March 29, 1980.

No ruling even was handed down by this Court on the aforegoing, which confirms the belief that, given the voluminous testimony presented to this Court for review, Defendant Young was once again "...lost in the shuffle".

Mr. Young's cause should be reheard, if only for this prejudicial oversight that directly affects his right to a fair and equitable rehearing on all matters brought before this Court.

III

John D. Fisher through undersigned counsel adopts the rehearing briefs and briefs for rehearing en banc of other appellants filed in this cause.

IV

John D. Fisher asks that rehearing be granted, and that this Court's opinion be withdrawn and that Fisher's conviction and sentence be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Arthur W. Fisher, III

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was furnished by mail to Sara Criscitelli, Appellate Section, Criminal Division, U. S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20531; and to all other counsel on this 1st day of August, 1981.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

No 81 5820

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JOHN D. FISHER

Petitioner

vs.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

No.

JOHN D. FISHER

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ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner moves the Court for an order permitting him to proceed in this Court, in forma pauperis, with his Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals filed on June 19, 1981 in U. S. vs. Martino, et al., 648 F.2d 367(5th Cir. 1981) pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 1915 and Rule 46 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

Petitioner is represented by appointed counsel by the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as amended, 18 U.S.C. Section 3006 and 18 U.S.C. section 3006A. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46, Petitioner is not filing an affidavit with this motion.

Petitioner is entitled to redress by Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and his petition presents substantial questions. He is seeking relief from his conviction under the RICO statute 18 U.S.C. Section 1961 et seq.

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is being filed with this motion.

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Counsel for: John D. Fisher

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERITIFY that a copy of the foregoing was furnished by U. S. Mail delivery by depositing it in the U. S. Post Office, addressed to all counsel for co-defendants and to Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530 and Sara Criscitelli, Appellate Division, Department of Justice, P. O. Box 899, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28, this 4th day of December, 1981.

Petitioner's Reply Brief

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 81-5820

JOHN D. FISHER,

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Respondent.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIOARAI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY TO BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Arthur W. Fisher, III
P. O. Box 1889
Tampa, Florida 33601
(813) 224-0415

JOHN D. FISHER, Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 81-5820

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY TO BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

ARGUMENT

The government's Brief in Opposition at page 11 states that co-defendants, Fisher and Young, as established by the evidence, had an unconsummated plan to acquire another building and burn it down in order to collect the insurance (50 Tr. 311, 313-314). This simply is not true. It is evidence barred (82 Tr. 76-78, 83, 84) by petitioner's joint trial Motion in Limine (3Tr. 370) that was granted by U. S. District Judge William Terrell Hodges and subsequently ignored by the government and still not ruled upon by the 5th (now 11th) circuit.[1]

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[1] As pointed out on the first page of Robert D. Young's Petition for Rehearing to the 5th Circuit affixed to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari sent this Court, the 5th Circuit never did rule on the Motion to Srike Part of Appellee's Brief filed with it on March 12, 1980. Bases for this motion was the heresay testimony barred by the trial Court in granting defendants trial Motion in Limine or, Alternately, Motion to Strike (82 Tr. 76-78, 83, 84).

The government's reference to this prejudicial testimony is improper. It is a continuing attempt to establish a pattern of racketeering activity making applicable the RICO statute to Petitioners, Fisher and Young.

Wherefore, Petitioner seeks this Court's assistance in rectifying this highly prejudicial error by granting his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Questioning of Willie Noriega by U. S. prosecutor Hogue: (50 Tr. 314)

Q. You mentioned they had talked to you, these two men had talked to you about an earlier deal?

A. Yes, sir. That is how I got to talk to them about arson.

Q. What was the earlier deal you had talked to them about?

A. Mr. Young and Mr. Fisher had som deal working in Miami through a Bucky Garcia on a big building they wanted burned and Bucky Garcia approached me with Mr. Fisher to have me burn the building in Miami.

Q. Did that come about?

A. No, sir. Y'all arrested Mr. Garcia before he could carry out the transaction.

In its brief the government stated that petitions No. 81-5820 and 81-5826 were not filed until December 7, 1981, and therefore are out of time under rules 20.1 and 20.4 of the Rules of this Court. However, petitioner did write this court for an extension of time until December 10, 1981.

Attorney for petitioner requests that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this cause not be prejudiced for the following reasons:

Petitioner John D. Fisher's Petition, as well as that of Petitioner, Robert D. Young's (No. 81-5826), were ready for timely filing with the Court on November 16, 1981.

However, since attorney Guy E. Labalme (counsel for Petitioner Robert D. Young) and the undersigned wished to edit their respective petitions, a telephone request for a brief time extension was made. The office of your Clerk of Court in turn suggested we send it a joint telegram, followed by a written motion for a time extension, both of which were done. Had Petitioner's attorneys surmised from their November 16, 1981, telephone conversation with the Clerk of Court's office that the time extension might be denied, then the Petitions (albeit not edited to ultimate satisfaction) would have been filed by November 16, 1981. A third petition (No. 81-5865) also was filed later (December 10, 1981).

Subsequently the government sought an extension of time until January 23, 1982, in which to file its response. On January 22, 1982 the government sought a second time extension, up to and including February 13, 1982, to file its response.

The length and complexity of the trial record and related appellate litigation were cited as necessary reasons for this second extension. Nowhere in its extension requests did the government mention the three late petitions for certiorari as contributing reasons. And, out of professional courtesy, petitioner did not object to the government's requests for these two time extensions.

No party has been harmed or prejudiced by Petitioners' delayed filing or by the two extensions of time granted the government. Accordingly, petitioner respectfully asks that this Court grant his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was furnished by U. S. Mail delivery by depositing it in the U. S. Post Office, addressed to all counsel for co-defendants and to Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530 and Sara Criscitelli, Appellate Division, Department of Justice, P. O. Box 899, Ben Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20004, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28, this 8th of March, 1982.

Arthur W. Fisher, III